Ariel Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm of NY Harbor by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-17-2014 
Ariel Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm of NY Harbor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Ariel Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm of NY Harbor" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 580. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/580 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2023 
_____________ 
 
ARIEL GONZALEZ, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF  
THE NEW YORK HARBOR  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                        
District Court No. 2-13-cv-00978 
District Judge: The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg     
_____________                        
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and HARDIMAN,  
Circuit Judges 
 
2 
 
(Filed: June 17, 2014) 
 
Michael A. Bukosky, Esq. 
Marcia J. Tapia, Esq. 
Loccke, Correia, Limsky & Bukosky 
24 Salem Street 
Hackensack, NJ 07601 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Phoebe S. Sorial, Esq. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 
39 Broadway, 4th Floor 
New York, NY 10006 
 Counsel for Appellee 
                            
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
Ariel Gonzalez filed this action against his former 
employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York 
Harbor (the “Commission”), seeking to enjoin 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a 
violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the First Amendment. The 
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United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed 
and administratively terminated this suit based on its 
conclusion that the Younger1 abstention doctrine 
precluded federal interference with the ongoing state 
disciplinary proceedings. During the pendency of this 
appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sprint 
Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013), 
which provides clarity to the abstention inquiry and 
defines the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. 
Reviewing this appeal in light of Sprint, we conclude that 
the decision to abstain was appropriate. Accordingly, we 
will affirm.  
I. 
 The Waterfront Commission of the New York 
Harbor is a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and 
New York that was created in 1953 with a mission to 
investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity 
in the Port of New York-New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
32:23-1 et seq. The Commission is a fully recognized law 
enforcement agency, and detectives of the agency are 
vested with all powers of a police officer in both states. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-86(4). 
 Gonzalez began his employment as a detective 
with the Commission in 1999, and he remained in this 
                                                 
1  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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position throughout the fourteen years preceding this 
litigation. In June 2012, a former coworker, Kimberly 
Zick, asked Gonzalez to assist her with a lawsuit she was 
bringing against the Commission that alleged 
employment discrimination under the ADA and Title 
VII. Gonzalez agreed and, on June 4, 2012, executed a 
sworn affidavit on Zick’s behalf. On October 4, 2012, 
Zick’s case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Zick v. Waterfront 
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, No. 11-5093 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 
2012). 
 Upon review of Gonzalez’s affidavit, the 
Commission determined that it contained several 
materially false statements and that, under the collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the Commission 
and the Detectives’ Endowment Association P.B.A. 
Local 195 (of which Gonzalez was a member), Gonzalez 
was subject to discipline for making these statements. On 
October 19, 2012, a few days after Zick’s suit was 
dismissed, the Commission advised Gonzalez that he was 
the subject of an internal investigation related to the 
potentially false statements in his June 4, 2012 affidavit. 
As part of the investigation, on December 3, 2012, 
Gonzalez—represented by counsel—was questioned 
under oath by an internal affairs officer designated by the 
Commission. During the interrogation, Gonzalez 
maintained that the statements contained in the June 4, 
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2012 affidavit were true.  
At the conclusion of the investigation, the 
Commission concluded that Gonzalez had indeed made 
false statements in the affidavit. On February 7, 2013, the 
Commission served Gonzalez with a Statement of 
Charges, alleging that he demonstrated a reckless 
disregard for the truth in making false statements in 
connection with Zick’s case. Specifically, the Statement 
of Charges provided that “on or about June 4, 2012, 
[Gonzalez] executed a duly sworn affidavit, in which 
paragraphs 9, 16 and 17 contain false and inaccurate 
statements therein; and on December 3, 2012, [he] 
affirmed these false statements while testifying under 
oath during an administrative investigation into the false 
statements.” App. 53. 
Under Section 17 of the CBA, a law enforcement 
officer with the Commission may not be removed from 
employment or subjected to disciplinary penalties unless 
the charges are sustained following a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Gonzalez was advised 
that a hearing would be held on February 20, 2013, and 
that he had the right to be represented by counsel and to 
present witnesses and evidence on his behalf. Gonzalez 
was also advised that establishment of the charges could 
result in termination of his employment. At Gonzalez’s 
request, the hearing was postponed until March 14, 2013. 
As permitted by the CBA, Gonzalez was suspended 
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without pay pending the determination of the charges by 
the ALJ.  
On February 14, 2013, Gonzalez’s counsel wrote 
to the Commission “requesting that Detective Gonzalez 
be immediately returned to active duty and that the 
charges be dismissed.” App. 88. Counsel argued that 
“both the disciplinary charges as well as the underlying 
investigation are retaliatory action under the ADA and 
Title VII and should not have occurred.” App. 87–88. 
The Commission responded in writing the same day, 
denying the request for reinstatement and dismissal of 
charges and contending that “Gonzalez’s suspension is 
neither retaliatory nor discriminatory.” App. 91. 
A few days later, on February 19, 2013, Gonzalez 
filed this action in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, alleging violations under the 
ADA, Title VII, and the First Amendment. In his 
complaint, Gonzalez requested that the Court 
“[p]reliminarily, temporarily and permanently enjoin[] 
the defendant from suspending [him] without pay” and 
“from prosecuting, scheduling or conducting any 
disciplinary hearing.” App. 19. Gonzalez also sought an 
order rescinding the charges and providing for 
compensatory damages.   
On March 13, 2013, the District Court issued an 
order denying Gonzalez’s request for a preliminary 
injunction. Applying the three-part test articulated in 
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Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar 
Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), the Court 
concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine required 
dismissal of the federal suit because the state 
administrative hearing (1) was judicial in nature, (2) 
implicated important state interests, and (3) offered an 
adequate opportunity for Gonzalez to present his federal 
claims.  
The hearing before the ALJ commenced the 
following day, March 14, 2013, and continued for two 
additional days on March 25 and 26, 2013. On the first 
day of the hearing, Gonzalez’s counsel informed the ALJ 
about the District Court’s order and asked whether 
Gonzalez would be permitted to prosecute his ADA and 
Title VII claims. The ALJ instructed that he would not 
entertain Gonzalez’s retaliation claims: 
I can tell you that I’m not [going to consider 
the ADA and Title VII claims.] I don’t have 
the authority to do it [and] I’m not prepared 
to do it. . . . I am here as a Hearing Officer 
on the internal matter only, not the rest of it. 
App. 99–100. 
 On April 10, 2013, Gonzalez filed a notice of 
appeal from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
federal suit. On June 16, 2013, while Gonzalez’s appeal 
with this Court was pending, the ALJ issued a Report and 
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Recommendation to the Commission with detailed 
factual findings. The ALJ found that Gonzalez’s June 4, 
2012 affidavit was “replete with inaccurate statements of 
fact, most of which could have been verified beforehand 
with only a modest degree of diligence.” App. 134. 
Weighing the importance of a law enforcement officer’s 
credibility and truthfulness, the ALJ concluded that 
“termination of [Gonzalez’s] employment is the only 
appropriate disposition.” App. 135.  
By decision dated July 15, 2013, the Commission 
followed the ALJ’s recommendation and terminated 
Gonzalez’s employment. On August 20, 2013, Gonzalez 
appealed his termination to the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division (the “State Appeal”). See In 
the Matter of the Internal Disciplinary Hearing of 
Detective Ariel Gonzalez, No. A-6140-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div.).  In addition to challenging the Commission’s 
decision to terminate his employment, Gonzalez filed a 
Case Information Statement that also listed his ADA, 
Title VII, and First Amendment claims. Gonzalez’s State 
Appeal remains pending as of the date of this decision.  
II. 
 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because it arises 
following a stay and administrative termination under 
Younger. See Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 
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F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 “We exercise plenary review over whether the 
requirements for abstention have been met.” ACRA Turf, 
LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d 
Cir. 2010)). 
III. 
 It has long been said that “[w]hen a Federal court 
is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law 
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.” 
Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y., 212 U.S. 19, 40 
(1909); see also Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 
404 (1821) (stating that federal courts “have no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given”). As a 
“general rule,” this longstanding principle—that federal 
courts are obliged to hear and decide cases within the 
scope of their jurisdiction—is unimpeded by parallel 
state proceedings involving the same or similar subject 
matter. Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 588 (citing Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976)). This rule, however, is not absolute. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that federal adjudication 
may, in certain circumstances, unduly interfere with 
ongoing state proceedings such that abstention is 
necessary to “accord[] appropriate deference to the 
‘respective competence of the state and federal court 
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systems.’” England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. 
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (quoting Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 
(1959)). 
Although not the Supreme Court’s first abstention 
case, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is now 
identified as the landmark decision in the field and the 
eponym of this subclass of the abstention doctrine. In 
Younger, the Supreme Court held that, absent a showing 
of bad faith or an intent to harass, federal courts should 
decline requests to enjoin state criminal prosecutions, 
“particularly . . . when the moving party has an adequate 
remedy” in state court. 401 U.S. at 43. Although crafted 
in the criminal context, “the Supreme Court has since 
extended Younger’s application to bar federal 
interference with certain state civil and administrative 
proceedings.” ACRA Turf, 748 F.3d at 132 (providing a 
detailed discussion of the development of the abstention 
doctrine from Younger through Sprint).  
As Younger was expanded to new categories of 
cases, lower courts struggled to pinpoint the doctrine’s 
outer limits and, as a result, increasingly declined to 
exercise federal jurisdiction when the subject matter of 
the federal suit was also implicated in a parallel state 
proceeding. See ACRA Turf, 748 F.3d at 135; see also 
Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its 
Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 12 Nev. L.J. 1, 9 
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n.62 (2011) (discussing empirical finding that, between 
1995 and 2006, a party seeking abstention under Younger 
was successful 51.6 percent of the time). Although 
professing to merely restate abstention principles found 
in its existing precedent, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Sprint goes a long way toward erasing any 
uncertainties about Younger’s reach. Sprint provides a 
forceful reminder that abstention is not the presumptive 
course, but rather an exception to the general rule that 
federal courts must hear and decide cases within their 
jurisdiction. 134 S. Ct. at 588. According to the Court, 
Younger can overcome this general rule in only three 
“exceptional” classes of cases: (1) “state criminal 
prosecutions,” (2) “civil enforcement proceedings,” and 
(3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are 
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 
perform their judicial functions.” Id. (quoting New 
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New 
Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 373 (1989)). “[T]hese 
three ‘exceptional’ categories,” said the Court, “define 
Younger’s scope.” Id. at 591. 
As in Sprint, this appeal concerns a state 
proceeding falling in the second category—civil 
enforcement proceedings. But not all state civil 
enforcement proceedings are treated equally, nor do all 
require federal abstention. Instead, as Sprint explains, 
abstention generally is appropriate only where the state 
civil enforcement proceeding is “‘akin to a criminal 
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prosecution’ in ‘important respects.’” 134 S. Ct. at 592 
(quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 
(1975)). See also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (stating that 
Younger abstention is appropriate where “noncriminal 
proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings 
criminal in nature”). In Sprint, the Court noted that quasi-
criminal proceedings of this ilk share several 
distinguishing features. They “are characteristically 
initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party 
challenging the state action, for some wrongful act.” 
Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592. “[A] state actor is routinely a 
party to the state proceedings and often initiates the 
action.” Id. And finally, they often begin with internal 
investigations that “culminat[e] in the filing of a formal 
complaint or charges.” Id. 
In focusing the abstention inquiry on whether the 
state proceeding is quasi-criminal, Sprint explicitly 
eschewed exclusive reliance on the three Middlesex 
factors. In Middlesex, the Court noted that abstention is 
appropriate where there is an ongoing state proceeding 
that (1) is judicial in nature, (2) implicates important state 
interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to 
raise federal challenges. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. 
Over the years following Middlesex, lower courts 
engaged in a routine practice of exclusively applying 
these three factors as if they were the alpha and omega of 
the abstention inquiry. In Sprint, the Court repudiated 
this practice, explaining that the Middlesex conditions 
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were never intended to be independently dispositive, but 
“were, instead, additional factors appropriately 
considered by the federal courts before invoking 
Younger.” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593 (emphasis in 
original). Importantly, the Court instructed that the 
Middlesex factors cannot be “[d]ivorced from their quasi-
criminal context.” Id. 
Using Sprint as our guide, we recently reversed a 
district court’s decision to dismiss a suit on Younger 
abstention grounds. See ACRA Turf, 748 F.3d 127. In 
2002, the New Jersey legislature passed a law allowing 
for the establishment of fifteen off-track wagering 
(“OTW”) facilities. Id. at 129. Pursuant to a condition in 
the law, the rights to establish and license these facilities 
were allocated by contract to three entities—the New 
Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, ACRA Turf, 
LLC (“ACRA”), and Freehold Raceway Off Track, LLC 
(“Freehold”). Id. Disappointed by the slow pace at which 
the OTW facilities were being opened, New Jersey 
amended the law in 2011 to require rights holders to 
submit petitions demonstrating that they were “making 
progress” toward opening their allotted facilities in order 
to avoid forfeiture of their rights. Id. at 129–30. ACRA 
and Freehold responded by submitting petitions 
specifying their ongoing efforts to open new facilities 
and, in addition, also contended that the amendments 
violated their constitutional rights under the Contracts, 
Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of 
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the United States Constitution. Id. at 130. They also filed 
suit in federal court challenging the amendments on the 
same constitutional grounds and seeking to enjoin their 
enforcement. Id. 
Applying Middlesex and noting that ACRA and 
Freehold asserted their constitutional challenges in their 
progress petitions—which were presented to an 
administrative body whose decision was appealable to 
the New Jersey courts—the district court dismissed the 
federal suit on Younger abstention grounds. Applying 
Sprint, we reversed. We noted that the state proceeding 
did “not bear any of the hallmarks that Sprint and its 
predecessors identify with quasi-criminal actions.” ACRA 
Turf, 748 F.3d at 138. “It was not initiated by the State in 
its sovereign capacity,” but rather by the plaintiffs when 
they submitted their progress petitions. Id. There was no 
preliminary investigation or formal charges, nor was 
there evidence that the proceeding “was commenced to 
sanction Plaintiffs for some wrongful act.” Id. at 139. 
And finally, “there [was] no indication that the policies 
implicated in the state proceeding could have been 
vindicated through enforcement of a parallel criminal 
statute.” Id. Accordingly, we held that abstention was 
inappropriate because the state proceeding was no “more 
akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases.” 
Id. (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). 
Unlike ACRA Turf, this case fits neatly within the 
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quasi-criminal framework outlined in Sprint. Gonzalez’s 
troubles began when the Commission suspected that he 
had made several materially false statements in his June 
4, 2012 affidavit. The Commission internally 
investigated the falsity of these statements and, after 
confirming them to be untruthful, lodged a formal 
Statement of Charges against Gonzalez. By filing this 
formal Statement of Charges, the Commission—an arm 
of the State of New Jersey—initiated the administrative 
disciplinary hearing to sanction Gonzalez for his 
“wrongful” conduct. This is a textbook example of a 
quasi-criminal action. 
This is not the type of situation we confronted in 
ACRA Turf, where the “penalty” imposed by the statute 
was in reality just an attempt by the State to induce the 
plaintiffs to exercise their rights in a particular way. In 
that case, there was no suggestion that the plaintiffs’ 
conduct was unlawful or even morally wrongful. See 
ACRA Turf, 748 F.3d at 140. In marked contrast, the 
disciplinary hearing in this case was unquestionably 
designed to sanction (or punish) Gonzalez for conduct 
the State deemed contemptible. And the “sanction” is 
clear; if the charges were sustained, Gonzalez faced 
termination of his employment. Compare Middlesex, 457 
U.S. at 427 (abstaining in a matter concerning a 
disciplinary hearing which subjected federal plaintiff, a 
lawyer, to disbarment). Significantly, New Jersey could 
have vindicated similar interests by enforcing its criminal 
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perjury statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-1. See Trainor v. 
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (supporting its 
decision to abstain by pointing out that “[t]he state 
authorities also had the option of vindicating these 
policies through criminal prosecutions”). 
In sum, we conclude that the state disciplinary 
proceeding involved in this appeal bears the hallmarks of 
the quasi-criminal proceedings discussed by the Supreme 
Court. It was initiated by a state actor following an 
internal investigation and the filing of formal charges for 
the purpose of sanctioning Gonzalez for his wrongful 
actions. Given these circumstances, we hold that 
Gonzalez’s disciplinary hearing and the pending State 
Appeal are indeed “akin to a criminal prosecution.”  
IV. 
The fact that the state proceeding was quasi-
criminal in nature, however, does not end our inquiry, as 
we must also consider whether the three Middlesex 
factors are satisfied. See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593 (noting 
that, after concluding a state proceeding is quasi-
criminal, the three Middlesex conditions are “additional 
factors appropriately considered by the federal court 
before invoking Younger”). These factors include: (1) 
whether there is an ongoing state proceeding that was 
judicial in nature, (2) whether that proceeding implicates 
important state interests, and (3) whether the state 
proceeding provides an adequate opportunity for 
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Gonzalez to raise his federal claims. Because each of 
these factors is satisfied in this case, we conclude 
abstention is the proper course. 
There was certainly an ongoing state proceeding at 
the time the District Court entered its abstention order. 
Gonzalez was entitled to present the facts and evidence in 
an open hearing before an ALJ, who was empowered to 
make factual determinations with respect to the charges 
filed by the Commission. This hearing was 
unquestionably judicial in nature as it afforded Gonzalez 
with an opportunity to be heard, the right to be 
represented by counsel, and the right to present evidence 
and witnesses on his behalf.  
We are not persuaded by Gonzalez’s contention 
that because the administrative hearing was an internal 
procedure collectively negotiated as part of the CBA it 
should not be deemed “judicial.” We fail to see why the 
fact that the disciplinary hearing was contractually 
mandated strips it of its judicial qualities. Nor do we see 
any principled basis for distinguishing this hearing from 
the types relied upon in other Supreme Court cases, 
including the state bar ethics committee’s disciplinary 
hearing in Middlesex. And, at all events, the 
Commission’s ultimate decision to terminate Gonzalez 
has since been appealed to an undeniably judicial 
forum—the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate 
Division—where it remains pending as of the date of this 
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decision. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 436 (stating that 
“there is no reason for the federal courts to ignore . . . 
subsequent [procedural] development[s]” occurring 
during the pendency of an appeal). Consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s repeated approach when confronted 
with administrative matters appealable to the state courts, 
“[w]e will assume . . . that an administrative adjudication 
and the subsequent state court’s review of it count as a 
‘unitary process’ for Younger purposes.” Sprint, 134 S. 
Ct at 592 (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369). See also 
ACRA Turf, 748 F.3d at 138 n.9 (“We . . . assume, for 
purposes of this opinion, that the Commission’s review 
. . . and the [appeal to the State appellate court] are both 
components of a single state proceeding.”). Accordingly, 
we find there was and is an ongoing state proceeding that 
is judicial in nature.  
We also have little trouble concluding that the state 
proceeding implicates important state interests. The 
Commission bears the ultimate responsibility for 
regulating the conduct of its employees, and we agree 
that it has a legitimate interest in maintaining the 
integrity, public confidence, and goodwill of its law 
enforcement officers. Moreover, it is not unreasonable 
for the Commission to be concerned that allowing 
perjured statements to go unpunished could have a 
detrimental impact on its ability to successfully prosecute 
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cases, especially since the Commission’s Brady2 
obligations require it to disclose impeachment 
information related to its testifying officers. Thus, we 
find the state proceeding constitutes an attempt by the 
Commission to vindicate important state interests. 
Finally, we conclude that the state proceeding 
offered an adequate opportunity for Gonzalez to raise his 
constitutional claims. Gonzalez disputes this point, 
arguing that no such opportunity was afforded in light of 
the ALJ’s explicit refusal to entertain his federal 
challenges. We do not doubt that Gonzalez is 
disappointed the ALJ refused to consider whether the 
Commission violated his constitutional rights. But his 
window of opportunity to raise these claims is not yet 
closed, as he is permitted to—and indeed has—raised his 
federal claims in his appeal to the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division. 
The Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, 
affirmed decisions to abstain notwithstanding the state 
agency’s refusal or inability to consider federal 
challenges in the initial administrative proceeding—at 
least where those challenges may be presented on appeal 
to the state court. See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435–
36 (applying Younger despite the state bar ethics 
committee’s refusal to entertain the federal plaintiff’s 
                                                 
2  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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constitutional challenges because those challenges were 
available for consideration on review to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton 
Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986) 
(acknowledging plaintiff’s argument that Ohio law does 
not allow the Commission to consider the 
constitutionality of the challenged statute and stating: “In 
any event, it is sufficient under Middlesex that 
constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial 
review of the administrative proceeding.”). Our Court has 
recognized this concept as well. Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 
204, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (“This Court has noted that the 
third part of the [Middlesex] test ‘is satisfied in the 
context of a state administrative proceeding when the 
federal claimant can assert his constitutional claims 
during state-court judicial review of the administrative 
determination.’”) (citation omitted).  
In determining whether a federal plaintiff has an 
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims 
during state-court judicial review of the administrative 
decision, we ask whether “state law clearly bars the 
interposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore v. Sims, 
442 U.S. 415, 425–26 (1979) (emphasis added). In 
making this determination, we consider whether state law 
raises procedural barriers to the presentation of the 
federal challenges. See id. at 430 (“In sum, the only 
pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford 
an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims, 
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and Texas law appears to raise no procedural barriers.”); 
id. at 432 (“[T]he appellees have not shown that state 
procedural law barred presentation of their claims—in 
fact Texas law seems clearly to the contrary.”).  
Gonzalez has not suggested any reason for us to 
believe the New Jersey courts are procedurally barred 
from considering his federal challenges during their 
review of the Commission’s termination decision. In fact, 
it appears the New Jersey courts have repeatedly 
recognized their authority to consider constitutional 
challenges during appellate review of administrative 
determinations. The New Jersey Superior Court, 
Appellate Division had this to say: “[A]lthough our role 
in reviewing the actions of administrative agencies is 
limited, we are clearly empowered to determine whether 
an agency’s decision offends the State or Federal 
Constitution.” In re Disciplinary Action Against 
Gonzalez, 964 A.2d 811, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009) (citing George Harms Const. Co. v. Tpk. Auth., 
644 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1994); Campbell v. Dep’t. of Civil 
Serv., 189 A.2d 712 (N.J. 1963)). As the appellant in the 
case just cited, Gonzalez should be well acquainted with 
the New Jersey courts’ authority to review his federal 
claims. 
V. 
In light of the quasi-criminal nature of Gonzalez’s 
administrative hearing and our finding that the Middlesex 
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conditions have been satisfied, we conclude that the 
District Court correctly abstained from adjudicating 
Gonzalez’s claims. Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
